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Petitioner - Appellee,

Court of Appeals
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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)
Appellant Mark Tracy hereby submits the following
Opening Brief
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caption herein,
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL
UTAH CONST. Art. I, Sect. 7 [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
UTAH CONST. Art. I, Sect. 11
injuries.]

[Courts open -- Redress of

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
UTAH CODE ANN.
78B-6-301.
Acts and omissions constituting contempt.
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court
or its proceedings are contempts of the authority of
the court:
(5) disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or
process of the court;
78B-6-303.
Warrant of attachment or commitment order
to show cause.
If the contempt is not committed in the immediate view
and presence of the court or judge, a warrant of
attachment may be issued to bring the person charged to
3
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answer. If there is no previous arrest, a warrant of
commitment may, upon notice, or upon an order to show
cause, be granted. A warrant of commitment may not be
issued without a previous attachment to answer, or a
notice or order to show cause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

Appellee (hereafter, "Vicchrilli") initiated the
present action to enforce a judgment for purported,
back-child support against Appellant (hereafter
"Tracy"). In the copy of the order to show cause served
to Tracy on December 29, 2010, Vicchrilli redacted her
contact information with black marker and white
correction tape. [R. at 120.] Lacking in

personam

jurisdiction, the trial court's finding of contempt as
well as monetary judgment against Tracy are null and
void.
The trial court's finding of contempt is also
materially deficient. In particular, the trial court
failed to determine the factual ability of Tracy to
comply with the court order citing general employment
statistics in the country Tracy did not reside.
4
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The trial court's monetary judgment against Tracy
is likewise materially deficient. In particular, the
trial court failed to allow evidence that the minor
child neither lived with nor received financial support
from Vicchrilli. Moreover, the court failed to set off
expenses Tracy made directly to his daughter for
college expenses.
This Court should therefore vacate the judgment
entered by the trial court in its entirety, as well as
grant Tracy costs and expenses on appeal.

II. Statement of Facts
1. Vicchrilli and Tracy are the parents of Kamrie P.
Reineccius born out of wedlock (hereafter "Kamrie").
Despite having a single, sexual encounter with
Vicchrilli when he was 16 years old, Tracy voluntarily
acknowledged paternity of Kamrie on April 4, 1990. [R.
at 3 .]
2. In fulfillment of the judgment entered by the trial
court the next year [R. at 43], Tracy entered into Army

5
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branch of military service and made direct payments to
Vicchrilli without delay until 2003.
3. On or around Kamrie's 13th birthday, Vicchrilli
abandoned her previous place of residence and actively
concealed both her residency as well as that of Kamrie.
[R. at 259, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 17 In. 17-21.]
After that date, Kamrie neither resided with Vicchrilli
nor received financial support from her.

(Id.)

4. In October 2009, after obtaining majority, Kamrie
contacted Tracy and informed him of her current
residence in Coeur D'Alene, Idaho. Tracy initiated
personal contact with Kamrie on that same day and
subsequently gave her direct financial assistance in
order for her to attend college classes at the Northern
Idaho University in the amount of $3,063.39. [R. at
259, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 17, In. 2-7.]
5. Despite having failed to give Kamrie a home and
financial support since 2003, Vicchrilli petitioned the
trial court to enforce the child support order entered
against Tracy nineteen years earlier. [R. at 114.]

6
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I
6. Appellant was served with Ms. Vicchrilli's petition
'

on December 29, 2 0 09 and ordered to appear before
Commissioner Patten on January 11, 2010 in violation of
the 14-day-notice requirement of Rule 101(b) Utah Code
of Civil Procedure. [R. at 128.] In her petition served
on Tracy, Vicchrilli redacted her contact information
with a black marked and white correction tape. [R. at
120.] Vicchrilli claimed an amount of $ 8,920.00 due to
her and an amount of $ 2,750.00 due the Office of
Recovery Service (hereafter "ORS"). [R. at 128.]
8. Tracy moved to quash the service of process. [R. at
126, Nr. 8.]

Commissioner Patten failed to rule on the

motion and instead entered a default judgment over
appellant's alternative request for continuance. [R. at
131.]
9. Upon Tracy's Rule 101 (k) objection, [R. at 134)
Judge McVey vacated the judgment and ordered a ude novo
hearing." [R. at 147.] Tracy renewed his motion to
quash the service of process. [R. at 216 Subhd. I.]
Judge McVey failed to rule on the motion.

7
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•
10. At the hearing, ORS failed to appear. Upon Tracy's
I

objection as to the actual amount documented by ORS,
the trial court noted:
Well, I'm wondering. They're an indispensible
party that should be present. I don't know. [R.
at 259, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 8 In. 25 - p. 9
In. 1.]

10.

Upon Tracy's further objection as to the documents

submitted by Vicchrilli [R. at 256, Addendum Exhib. 1
at p. 6 In. 25 - p.8 In. 7], the trial court noted:
Well, this does not appear to be a self-evident
document. I mean, I can't — without some
foundation from ORS, I'm not 100 percent sure
what this — what they mean by this. And we've
got a computer printout, and they've got
payments, they've got adjustments, they've got
a balance to date, they've taken some things
out here, they've got a current due of $17,925.
So I'm not quite sure what they mean by all of
that. (R. 259, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 9 In.
17-24) .]

11. Despite this unresolved uncertainty, the trial
court awarded Vicchrilli $11,670.00 to include $750.00
in attorney fees for Vicchrilli's prior council during
the unsuccessful proceedings before Commissioner Patten

8
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>

as well as attorney fees for the de novo hearing before
1

Judge McVey. [R. at 2 5 0.]
12. Over Tracy's objection that Vicchrilli had
concealed the location of his daughter's residence and
had thus forfeited her right to seek reimbursement for
child support the following exchange occurred:
MR. TRACY: ... The issue was is it was the —
was my daughter actually under the care of the
petitioner?
THE COURT: Well, no. No. That doesn't matter
either. Because the child support is for the
benefit of the — of the minor. It's not for the
benefit of the petitioner. [R. at 259, Addendum
Exhib. 1 at p. 18 In. 7-12).]

13. In finding Tracy in contempt, the trial court
simply noted:
The Court would also note that — find that
respondent has not paid child support, and,
further, with regard to his argument that he had
not the ability to pay it, the Court would note
that, at least from 2003 to 2007, the Court takes
judicial notice that the unemployment rate in this
country was around 5 percent, which economists
indicate is zero unemployment. Now, I realize that
that's — that's an average and that's — you know,
that doesn't mean that everybody's employed that
wants to be employed, but, nonetheless, there were
plenty of opportunities for employment, at least up
to the point where the economy south on us after
the collapse of the housing market [R. at 259,
9
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r
Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 4 0 In. 6-17; R. at 246 Nr.
6.]
>

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Having failed to fulfill the legal requirements of
a court summons as promulgated by Rule 4(c)(1) Utah
Code of Civil Procedure, the district court was not
vested with personal jurisdiction over Tracy. While
this issue is dispositive of this case, this Court has
affirmed the necessity of ruling on further merits of
the case when the possibility of further litigation is
anticipated. Parkside,

37 P.3d at 1208.

The following issues are relevant in any possible
future litigation:
1) Can Tracy be found in contempt of court without a
factual inquiry into his solvency?
2) Must the trial court allow evidence that the minor
child neither lived with nor received financial
support from the parent claiming past arrears?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3) Must the trial court allow off-set for college
expenses paid directly to the child after
emanc ipat ion?
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court was Not Vested with Personal
Jurisdiction over Tracy
Article 1, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution

requires that no person shall be deprived of liberty
with the due process of law. In turn, Section 78B-6-303
of the Utah Code Ann. provides for civil punishment for
contempt of court. In particular, it stipulates that a
court of competent jurisdiction must first issue an
order to show cause. Subsequently, Rule 4(c)(1) of the
Utah Code of Civil Procedure provides the procedural
basis for that determination. It stipulates that
The summons shall ... state the name, address
and telephone number of the plaintiff's
attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiff's
address and telephone number.
In the present case, the summons served on Tracy
was defective when Vicchrilli redacted her contact

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
information. This Court has previously addressed the
t

legal consequences of such deficiencies.
In Parkside,

i

this Court ruled on the legal effect

in an unlawful detainer action in which the summons
from the landlord failed to include the court's
endorsement as required under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8
(1996). Parkside,

37 P.3d at 1202. This court noted,

We ultimately conclude in this case that
Tenant's timely motion to quash a defective
summons was well-taken and precludes the trial
court from exercising personal jurisdiction
over Tenant. Id.
This promulgation expressly affirmed the Utah
Supreme Court decision in Tolbert,

in which the Court

held, "[t]he proper issuance and service of a
summons[,] which is the means of invoking the
jurisdiction of the court and of acquiring jurisdiction
over the defendant, is the foundation of a lawsuit."
Utah Sand

& Gravel

Prods.

Corp.

v.

Tolbert,

402 P. 2d

704.
Much like the language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8
directing that the "court shall

12

indorse upon the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

summons the number of days within which the defendant
•

is required to appear and defend the action,"
(emphasis added) as decided in Parkside,

Rule 4(c)(1)

of the Utah Code of Civil Procedure stipulates that the
i

party instigating contempt of court action "shall

...

state the name, address and telephone number of the
plaintiff's attorney, if any, and otherwise the
plaintiff's address and telephone number" (emphasis
added). As this Court noted in Parkside,

it is not the

prerogative of the courts to ignore legislative
mandates." Parkside

37 P.3d at 1207. Likewise, it was

not within prerogative of the district court to ignore
the decision of the Utah Supreme Court or a two-thirds
majority in both house of the Utah Legislature
(Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII Section 4) in
affirming the Utah Code of Civil Procedure.
Specifically, these provisions are the very guidelines
by which "Liberty" is guaranteed under Art. 1 Sect. 7
of the Utah Constitution.
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\

Vicchrilli, having redacted the court summon served
on Tracy failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial
court to adjudicate her purported claim. As such, the
ruling of the district court is null and void.

II. The Trial Court Failed to Determine that the
Appellant was Factually Able to Comply with the
Court Order and thus its Finding of Contempt is
Null and Void.
Because additional litigation is to be expected,
reasons of judicial efficiency necessitate additional
judicial guidance from this Court.
In the case of Bartholomew,

Utah Supreme Court was

confronted with a district court's sole determination
that uthe defendant is found in contempt of court for
not making payments to the complaining witness." The
Court held that,
such a finding is wholly insufficient as a
finding of fact and would not support the
judgment of contempt. State
v. Bartholomew,
P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1934).
The court further held that otherwise,
14
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38

I

^

the order or judgment adjudging defendant to be
in contempt has no support, is without
jurisdiction, and is null and void.
Barthowlomew,

38 P. 2d at 755.

j,

As such, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed its
holding in Kanendock.

>

State

v.

Kranendock,

9 p. 2d

176 (Utah 1932).
In the present case, the trail court neither
addressed the past or current employment of Tracy nor
made finding of fact in support of its judgment. Under
the binding ruling of the Utah Supreme Court, such a
judicial determination is null and void.

}

III. The Trial Court Erroneously Disallowed Evidence
that Appellee Failed to Provide a Home and

(

Financial Support to Kamrie and thus Forfeited
Her Right to Claim Past Arrears.
In the case of Wasescha,

the Utah Supreme Court

affirmed that a custodial parent forfeits her right
to claim back child support in the case where she has
not herself provided support and is not seeking
15
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reimbursement for past expenses. Wasescha
Wasescha,

v.

548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976).

In the present case, the trial court erroneously
concluded that it was not necessary for minor child to
reside with the custodial parent in order for that
parent to recover arrears from the non-custodial
parent. [R. at 2 56, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 18 In. 712.] Such a legal determination directly contradicts
the exception recognized by the Utah Supreme Court and
therefore denied Tracy his right to have his defense
heard in Court as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution
in Art. 1, Sect. 11.

IV. The District Court Failed to Set Off Expenditures
Made by Appellant Directly to his Daughter for
College Expenses.
While this issue has yet to be directly addressed by
Utah courts, several jurisdictions have allowed for
similar set-offs. In the case of Kinsey,

the Alaska

court ruled that no arrearages were owed when the non16
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custodial father made cash payments directly to the
>

children for tuition and books, as well as living and
medical expenses. Kinsey

v.

Kinsey,

425 So. 2d. 483

(Ala. Civ. App. 1983).
Likewise, in Mooty,

the Florida Supreme Court found

that the father had taken great interest in his
daughter's education and appreciated the advantages of
a college education. Although the parties had not
provided for the off-set in the original divorce
decree, the court found that the father had made a
)

great financial sacrifice which warranted reducing
arrears owed for alimony. Mooty

v.

Mooty,

131 Fla. 151,

(Fla. 1938).
Similar rulings include, Cronebaugh
415 So. 2d 738

as well as

v.

Van

Dyke,

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1982),

Sholom

v.

Schlom,

149 Miss. Ill, 115

(Miss 1928).
*

In the present case, the trial court seemed to
follow a somewhat circular reasoning. Tracy was not

^

allowed to set off expenses for college tuition against
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purported back arrears because he had "unclean hands"
>

(i.e., because he failed to make timely payments to
Vicchrilli). Because child support obligations end at
emancipation, it would be legally impossible to have
"clean hands" to set off purported past arrears as
recognized in the above-mentioned cases.
It therefore remains unclear whether Utah courts
will follow the precedence set it Florida, Mississippi
and Alaska. Such a determination would clearly benefit
a child, who after reach the age of emancipation must

)

make life-changing decisions as to her own uncertain
future.
CONCLUSION
The district court lacked in personam

jurisdiction

over Tracy. Court should therefore vacate the judgment
entered by the trial court in its entirety, as well as
grant Tracy costs and expenses on appeal. Utah Rules of
*

App. Proc. 34(a)(costs on appeal). Moreover, this Court
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should provide the aforementioned guidance in the
)

instance of future litigation.

Respectfully/submitted,

Mark Tracy

»
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit 1: Transcript of trial court hearing from
Monday, July 26, 2010 (R. 259) .

I

»
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PROVO, UTAH; MONDAY, JULY 26, 2010, 10:14 A.M.
-oooOoooTHE COURT:

Good morning.

Vicchrilli against Tracy matter.

This is on the

It's Case No. 904400716.

Would counsel please state your appearance?
MR. STARR:

Attorney Zachary Starr appearing for

Rebecca Vicchrilli, who's also present, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

And Mr. Tracy?

MR. TRACY:

Mark Tracy, respondent in this matter,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

And I believe we had

continued this hearing to determine — allow parties to look
at the issue of the $3,000; is that correct?
MR. STARR:

Yeah, Your Honor.

And I didn't hear a

direction at the last hearing to prepare an order, although
the docket did suggest that.

No order was prepared.

I

believe that was the direction that we were to head, as well
as the issues of contempt and appropriate sanctions.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. TRACY:

If I may make a comment, Your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. TRACY:

Also, the issue — there was a judgment

that was issued by this Court for an amount of $8,900.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. TRACY:

Leaving the $3,0 00 open.

The

3
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petitioner in this matter actually only claimed to - to be
making a claim of $8,900, which would reduce that sum down
if that - if the question of the $3,000 given to my daughter
for college, so that judgment would be appropriate at
$5,856.61.
THE COURT:

Is that your understanding also?

MR. STARR:

Well, Your Honor, if the Court reviews

back the file, the initial motion filed by my client — she
was representing herself at the time she filed that — she
did ask for a total judgment of $11,670, but she puts out to
the side — and I'm referring to the document Motion for
Order to Show Cause filed November 19th.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

MR. STARR:

She parses out there that a portion of

that was actually owed directly to the State of Utah.

Upon

her speaking with the State about that but prior to the
hearing on January 11th, she was informed that in fact
$11,670 was owing to her.

And that's what was represented

to Comm. Patton at the hearing, which was the order of the
Court at that time, that she was awarded $11,670.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So - so the State does have a

judgment or it does not?
MR. STARR:
they did not appear.

The State does have an interest, but
Although they were notified, they did

not appear.

4
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THE COURT:

Do they have a judgment is what I'm

MR. STARR:

They did not receive one at the

asking.

January 11th hearing.
THE COURT:

And they were not —
Okay.

So the State does not have a

judgment for any of this amount then.
MR. STARR:

No.

The full $11,67 0 was awarded to

petitioner, correct.
THE COURT:

By Comm. Patton?

MR. STARR:

By the commissioner, that's right.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. TRACY:

Your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. TRACY:

That judgment was vacated.

The State

of Utah, or is it still making that claim for $2,700?
That's still an open case for that $2,700.

That has been

outlined by the petitioner.
THE COURT:

So is that $2,700 included in this

$11,670 then?
MR. TRACY:

Yes, Your Honor.

Exactly.

Yes.

And

the State of Utah is seeking reimbursement for that amount.
That's why that — that amount is still open.

So that amount

has already been paid to the —
THE COURT:

Well, that - that - they may be

5
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seeking that, but have they filed a claim in this case for
that?
MR. STARR:

They have not, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. STARR:

So our — just to be clear —

THE COURT:

Wait.

Let me ask you, Mr. Tracy.

Do

you believe that the State has filed a claim for that amount
in this case?
MR. TRACY:

Yes, I believe they have, Your Honor.

In fact, I'd spoken with ORS last THE COURT:

What was the date?

I didn't see one

in here, is why I'm wondering.
MR. TRACY:

The date for?

THE COURT:

For them filing a claim.

MR. TRACY:

Actually, if you look at the

petitioner, it's actually outlined in the supplement.

There

is a —
THE COURT:
was filed?

Well, what's — what was the date that

I mean, this is a fairly thick file; I want to

make sure —
MR. TRACY:

If I could have you refer to the

supplement that was supplied by the — by the petitioner last
week.
THE COURT:

The supplemental memorandum?

MR. TRACY:

Yes.

Correct, Your Honor.

Exhibit

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No. — I believe Exhibit No. 1.

If you examine the judgment,

Your Honor, the tabulations for the balance to date, you
have the amount.

The closing date case run is $8,920.

The

very last line on page 4.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. TRACY:

And then the balance to date, $2,750,

that — that amount is still open with the ORS services and
still claimed by them.
THE COURT:

Well, it may be open, but what I'm

wondering, ORS — ORS can try and collect that but they don't
have a judgment for that in this case.

And they don't have

a — they have not made a claim for that in this case.

And

they haven't filed a separate case with the court seeking to
enforce that amount; is that correct?
MR. TRACY:

Well, I understand, Your Honor, but

the — that amount was paid directly to the petitioner, and
they're seeking reimbursement.

So, basically, the

petitioner has already received that amount from the State
of Utah and ORS is seeking to reimburse that amount that was
already given to her.

So petitioner in that instance would

actually be compensated double for that amount.
THE COURT

For the $10,900?

MR. TRACY

No.

THE COURT

And is that the - so $2,750.

MR. TRACY

Correct.

For the $2,750.
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THE COURT:

And so you're saying that, out of this

$ 1 1 , 67 0 she's claiming, she's already been compensated by

the State for $2,750; is that correct?
MR. TRACY:

Correct, Your Honor.

And the amount

that she would be claiming would be $8,920 , which, again,
she listed ve:ry, very correctly on her initial petition to
the court.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. TRACY:

Minus her contact information.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STARR:

It's not, Your Honor

Is that your understanding,

Mr. Starr?
Again, we — our

bel.Lef is that petitioner is owed $11,670 and the State is
owec3, on top of that, the amount that my c lient was informed
of was the $2,750.

So we believe that the total amount is

actually $14,000 plus, but a portion of that, the $2,750, is
the State's right to make a claim for that, not my client's.
When we're looking at that exhibit that was
attached to our supplemental draft, that in fact is not the
last line.

When you go down to the very bottom, it looks

like there's a number there showing that the adjustments — I
mean, these are always difficult to read and it's difficult
to determine without ORS present, but, essentially, when you
go back through this ledger —
THE COURT:

Well, I'm wondering.

They're an
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indispensable party that should be present.

I don't know.

But you 're saying that, on this exhibit, the $10,990, I
believe , is the — on page 3; is that what you're referring
to, or can we go —
MR. STARR:
Honor.

Page 4.
THE COURT:

yeah.

There's one more page, Your

No.

And the — shows the balance —

Page 4.

They got adjustments of $11 ,828

Is bhat what they're saying?

they've just closed that out?
MR. STARR:
happened.

Yeah.

Is that because

I bel ieve that s what's

And the minor child emancipated :m

July of 2008 -

THE COURT:

Well, thi s —

MR. STARR:

— and so some activity which happened

subsequent to that appears to be their own office
adjustments and other things of that nature, which I'm not
exactly clear on how they —
THE COURT:

Well, this does not appear to be a

self-evident document.

I mean, I can't — without some

foundation from ORS, I'm not 100 percent sure what this —
what they mean by this.

And we've got a computer printout,

and they've got payments, they've got adjustments, they've
got a balance to date, they've taken some things out here,
they've got a current due of $17,925.

So I'm not quite sure

what they mean by all of that.
MR. STARR:

Suffice it to say, Your Honor, to the

9
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extent that you're willing to recognize the proceedings
which did happen before the commissioner, there — there was
some corrections made to the petitioner's motion, and ORS
was notified, did not appear.
And if you go through and look at actually the
payments that were received, we have a bunch of zeros.

We

have three $110 payments, which we understand were made by
respondents to petitioner through ORS.

But calculating that

out, petitioner's claim before Comm. Patton was that she was
owed $11,670, exclusive of any interest, exclusive of any
claims by ORS or the State of Utah.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STARR:

And that was the judgment that was

awarded at that hearing and, you know, we — we entered, I
believe, at our hearing last month, Your Honor entered an
order of $8,670 and reserved the right to argue the
additional $3,000, which we'll do today.
THE COURT:

Right.

I believe that's correct.

All right.

You can proceed on the three —

MR. TRACY:

If I could interject one last thought,

Okay.

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Yes.

Uh-huh.

MR. TRACY:

What the petitioner has requested was

very, very clearly outlined in our original petition; i.e.,
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$2,700 — or $2,700 for ORS and then eight — this exact
amount that's listed here, $8,920 due to her.

So her

petition actually coincides with the document before the
Court.
THE COURT:

What's the date of the petition?

MR. TRACY:

The date of the original petition, I

believe, was November 17th, correct?
MR. STARR:

I believe he's referring to the motion

for order to show cause, Your Honor.
MR. TRACY:

The original motion, yes, Your Honor.

MR. STARR:

November 19th, 2009.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. TRACY:

If there was a change from that, that

would be a modification of the original petition, Your
Honor.
THE COURT:

I am not seeing where that amount is

specified in this petition or — I've got an order to show
cause, I've got a —
MR. TRACY:

The counsel for the petitioner has a

copy of that.
THE COURT:

I've got an - I've got an affidavit in

support of the motion for order to show cause.

I've got —

she doesn't really specify an amount, other than to say
that's — behind.

I've got —

MR. TRACY:

Your Honor -
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THE COURT:

— I ' v e got a motion for order to show

cause, which —

outdated.

MR. STARR:

That's it, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

— they've used this form, which is

We don't do these anymore.

But, anyway.

So

they've got unpaid child support for $11,670, and she's got
eighty-nine twenty owed to Rebecca Vicchrilli, $2,750 owed
to State of Utah.

Okay.

And then — but now you're claiming

there's another $3,000, right?
MR. STARR:

Yeah.

Our argument and our statement

today is that this was filed in November without —
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. STARR:

— the assistance of counsel.

THE COURT:

Right.

MR. STARR:

But she did this under belief.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STARR:

That's what ORS had said.

She went

back and spoke to them, corrected that at the hearing, which
is why the order which wasn't actually filed and entered by
this Court until, looks like, April 9th of 2010.

The actual

order which was submitted to this Court shows that she was
awarded $11,670.
So, although her original motion did have an
erroneous calculation, she corrected that at the hearing.
That was presented to the commissioner, and that was found -
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THE COURT:
understand.

Okay.

All right.

Okay.

I

So the amount at issue today is $3,000, and

then we're still looking at the issue of contempt?
MR. STARR:

Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STARR:

Contempt and appropriate sanctions, as

well as attorneys' fees —
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. STARR:

— were also reserved for today's

THE COURT:

Okay.

hearing.

proceed then.

All right.

Okay.

You can

Thank you.

MR. STARR:

Well, Your Honor, maybe we should just

start with — with that $3,000 payment.
This is payment which Mr. Tracy argues he made
directly to the parties' minor daughter — I'm sorry, adult
daughter after she had become an adult.

And as we have

outlined in our supplemental memorandum, this — this payment
actually cannot constitute payment of back-due child
support.
There was no agreement, there was no writing that
would serve as a credit or as an offset to that amount.
And has Your Honor had a chance to review this
brief?

Did you receive it timely?
THE COURT:

Yes.

Well, wasn't the original
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decree, didn't it require that payments be made to your
client?

I mean, no payments were authorized to be made

directly to the minor child, correct?

the brief?

MR. STARR:

That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STARR:

Typical — typical order.

THE COURT:

Right.

MR. STARR:

Has Your Honor had a chance to review

Okay.

I '11 THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. STARR:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Well, I got your courtesy copy.

I

don't know if the original ever made it to the file, but I
got the courtesy copy, so...
MR. STARR:

Okay.

I'll be brief in my argument

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STARR:

Not to repeat too much.

then.

As stated in our brief and as well as Your Honor
knows in case law, that statute requires a waiver in writing
in order to forgive back — back-due child support in order
for that to be effective.
The respondent has not argued that there was any
agreement, that there was any writing or that there was any
verbal waiver of that; rather, that he just made the payment
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directly to his daughter as an adult.
would be construed as a gift.

And I believe such

To allow otherwise would —

would be to take away the petitioner's right to receive
support which she provided during the child's minority.
Any further questions or clarifications needed by
Your Honor?
THE COURT:

What about the argument in the

respondent's memorandum that the effect — I think what he's
saying is that the petitioner made it difficult for him to
make payments because she concealed her residency?
that's the — the gist of what he's saying.

I think

Maybe he's just

saying he was denied contact with the child, which, of
course, wouldn't excuse responsibility to provide support.
What about that issue?
MR. STARR:

Well, that's my understanding, that he

simply was making a — an argument that it was not fair that
he shouldn't have the contact that he desired with his
daughter and, therefore, should be excused from that
payment.
And, also, it doesn't really apply in this case,
when ORS was involved.

If he's claiming that her

whereabouts were unknown, thus making it difficult to make
direct payment, but ORS has been involved in this matter for
quite some time.

And the amounts that we're seeking in

back-due support date back to 2003.

So her moving would not
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have mattered; ORS would have had constant communication and
contact with her.

And, in fact, there were three payments

made of $110 each in 2007.

Those reached petitioner.

So that would be our response to that argument.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Mr. Tracy?
MR. TRACY:

Yes, Your Honor.

The crux of that argument concerns, Your Honor,
and even in this case, as in the case from up till 2004,
actually, I believe, not 2003, is that the location of both
the petitioner and my daughter was completely unknown.

I

had no way of knowing if they were even residing in the
state of Utah.
Every — every indication that we had was
actually — was that my daughter was not residing in the
state of Utah, and that was in the original jurisdiction of
the Court.
When my daughter finally —
THE COURT:

And this began in 2 0 03, you're saying?

MR. TRACY:

Yes, Your Honor.

Yes, Your Honor.

Up

until that point, every payment had been made, every — every
instance of employment was reported to ORS.
THE COURT:

Were you — and you were paying ORS at

MR. TRACY:

Yes, I was.

the time?
Yes.
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1

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

2

MR. TRACY:

And during that time, again, once my

3

daughter's whereabouts were made known to me, it was

4

actually in Coeur d1 Alene, Idaho.

5

Coeur d1 Alene, Idaho to see my daughter, ascertain her

6

whereabouts, find out how she was doing.

7

drive.

I immediately drove to

That's a 13-hour

Drug my new wife along with me on that trip.

8 J

Through the years, we had had —

9

THE COURT

How old was your daughter in 2003?

10

MR. TRACY

She was 18 years old, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT

Okay.

12

MR. TRACY

Oh, 2003, she was 13 years old, Your

14

THE COURT:

13.

15

MR. TRACY:

That's correct.

16

Through the years, the respondent has actually

13

Honor.
Okay.

Thank you.

17

concealed her location through those — that time, because

18

she was very worried that she would lose the custody of her

19

daughter.

20

her high school years, that respondent wasn't even listed

21

as -

22

That was — we discovered, for instance, during

THE COURT:

Now, how is any of this relevant?

23

Because the child support is intended to support the

24

daughter not the respondent, not the petitioner —

25

MR. TRACY:

Yes, Your Honor.

17

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT:

— and the law in this state, anyway,

is that the things that the petitioner does doesn't excuse
away the obligation to pay child support.
MR. TRACY:

May I come to the podium, Your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yes, you may.

MR. TRACY:

Thanks.

The issue was is it was the — was my daughter
actually under the care of the petitioner?
THE COURT:
either.

Well, no.

No.

That doesn't matter

Because the child support is for the benefit of

the — of the minor.

It's not for the benefit of the

petitioner.
MR. TRACY:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

So that's why ORS collects it.

And so

that's the issue.
MR. TRACY:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay?

So whether she's actually under

the respondent's care — or the — I'm sorry, the petitioner's
care doesn't really matter because — because the obligation
is to the daughter and the petitioner cannot, by her
actions, waive the obligation for you to pay child support.
MR. TRACY:

Absolutely, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay?

MR. TRACY:

I agree with that point exactly.

All right.
And

that is the point.
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1

In the case here in Utah of — the last case

2

mentioned in my briefing, which was — which is actually the

3

one in Utah court, rulings of Waschesa

4

Exhibit 8.

5

arrears to the mother because the mother had not been

6

providing support — any type of support to the daughter.

7

And in that case, she did not claim to be seeking

8

reimbursement for — for payments that were made for the

9

daughter.

10

v.

Waschesa,

is

In that case, Your Honor, the Utah court denied

In that case, the court denied back arrears —
THE COURT:

Now, how does that relate to this

11

$3,000 though?

Because, here, you're seeking a credit for

12

that; you're not seeking — that's — that was your argument,

13

anyway, is you were seeking a credit for that.

14

MR. TRACY:

For the $3,000, yes.

15

THE COURT:

For three thousand, right?

16

MR. TRACY:

Correct.

Now, in the case - maybe I'm

17

just confusing the issue and I need to be clear about what

18

I'm speaking about.

19

support that was due from 2002 — or excuse me, 2003 until

20

2008, like I - like I stated, Your Honor, I had absolutely

21

no way to make payments, I had no idea if my daughter was

22

residing in the state of Utah.

23

THE COURT:

Well, you could have paid ORS, right?

24

MR. TRACY:

And I paid the amounts that I could at

25

If we're talking about the child

that particular point in time, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:

Well -

MR. TRACY:

The $110, which was given — which was

given at that time —
THE COURT:

Well, I realize you're saying that you

didn't have any money, but that's no excuse either, because,
unless you get the order modified, that's the amount you
have to pay.
MR. TRACY:

We actually did seek.

In the case

file, you'll see a petition by an attorney, Ms. Mary Brown,
who actually, in 2004, actually tried to find the respondent
in order to modify the child support.
THE COURT:

But she never -

MR. TRACY:

Correct, she never did modify it, yes,

THE COURT:

- no court ever modified the child

MR. TRACY:

She did not, no.

THE COURT:

Right.

MR. TRACY:

But that's just to show that efforts

sir.

support

Okay.

had been made to actually make those payments, have it
modified, and she could not be served because we did not
know her location at that time.

Even in this case, Your

Honor, again, her contact information, tried to conceal.
And that has been consistent.
Now, the issue on the - the $3,000 that was given
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directly to my daughter, the petitioner cites Utah Code,
which can certainly be read as a rule of evidence.

Any

estoppel or waiver has to be in writing.
The Utah courts have been silent on the issue;
other state courts have been very explicit in allowing this
type of setoff for payments that are made directly to the
daughter by the father, even though they are emancipated.
In Florida, in Maryland and also in Mississippi,
for instance, Your Honor, the courts have allowed that.

And

I think it's a very — it's a very important decision to make
in saying, well, there's a difference between a gift; i.e.,
is the minor given a wave runner or is she actually given
the means to actually make important life choices?

And

college education is certainly one of those.
THE COURT:

But the - I guess the distinction here

is — at least what I understand is that she's not a minor
when she receives this $3,000.
MR. TRACY:
they minors.

Correct.

Nor, in the other cases were

They were actually in college, and the courts

allowed that setoff.
THE COURT:

Well, they might have been in college,

but I don't know that they were emancipated.

I mean, you

can be in college — the — in those cases, did it say that
the — did it say how old the children were?
MR. TRACY:

Absolutely, Your Honor.

Yes, they
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were emancipated.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. TRACY:

In every case cited.

And there's —

there's four cases that were actually cited in this case.
As the Utah courts have been silent on this issue — and I
think an important distinction needs to be made.

In fact,

in this case, I think it is very, very clear what — what has
happened.

I'm going to say something which might embarrass

the petitioner, but it's entirely correct.

She's been

married four times, she has five children from —
MR. STARR:

Objection, Your Honor.

This is

irrelevant to the issue of support.
THE COURT:

How is any of this relevant?

MR. TRACY:

Because the idea is —

THE COURT:

And why would that have any influence

on my decision whatsoever?

The fact that she's been

married —
MR. TRACY:

Your Honor -

THE COURT:

- four times and has five children?

Why would that even begin to influence the legal decision
that the Court has to make?
MR. TRACY:

Because -

THE COURT:

Why would this be offered for anything

other than to impeach the character —
MR. TRACY:

If I could continue, Your Honor, I
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think I can answer that question.
THE COURT:

Well, you can continue, but I'm just

asking you to answer my question before you continue.

stake.

MR. TRACY:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay?

MR. TRACY:

The welfare of my daughter is at

And I had a choice when I made that payment to her

for college.

Either I could give it directly to her mother

and then hope that it would go to my daughter.

My daughter

wished to go to college, said she could not afford to go to
college, couldn't afford the living expenses associated with
college.
I was left with a decision at that particular
point in time.
me.

I had very little credit left available to

I could give that to the petitioner and then hope that

it would reach my daughter.
would not.

The factual situation is it

The factual situation is that she has not been

encouraging at all for my daughter to — to not be on state
welfare, to actually get an education, find training so she
might have specific life opportunities herself.

And I was

in a situation and I decided to give it directly to my
daughter because that was in the best interest of the child
that has now been emancipated.
THE COURT:

Who is no longer a child.

MR. TRACY:

Correct, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Go ahead, please.

MR. TRACY:

I believe that, in answer to this

question by the Utah courts, is very important also for a
policy point of view in that, again, emancipated child, this
idea, this — that one day she's a child and under the care
of the State and the next day, she's 18 and kind of off on
her own, that it's still the — not only was the $3,000
should be credited any type of judgment that would — for
back arrears, it also shows every attempt that was made on
my part to provide for the welfare of my daughter.

And that

comes also into play in the issue of contempt of court,
which is a separate issue that — that we're not addressing
right now; I understand that, Your Honor.
THE COURT

Okay.

MR. TRACY:

I have nothing further to say.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STARR:

Your Honor, may I respond briefly

Thank you.

while we're on the issue of the $3,000?
THE COURT:

You may.

Uh-huh.

MR. STARR:

Clearly, there is a petition to modify

located in the Court's file that was never followed up with
any order, and if petitioner were difficult to find or to be
served, there could have been an order seeking alternative
service.

The Court probably would have granted that if

evidence had been provided, but that didn't happen.

And so,
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1

without a modification, the current orders of the Court

2

stood.

3

entered in 1995 remained until the child became an adult.

And that original child support order which was

4

And the fact that — that she's now an adult just

5

waives the argument, because the time has passed, there's no

6

modification to be had at this point in time.

7

are what they are.

8
9

The arrears

As to the issue of whether or not payment to an
adult child should constitute payment to the petitioner,

10

well, that would completely obliterate and usurp the rights

11

of the petitioner as a parent, who previously provided

12

support.

13

respondent and made payments on a monthly basis.

14

to avoid paying her as a creditor, in a sense, as our courts

15

and our cases have noticed, would deny her of any and all

16

rights.

17

proper.

18
19

She was the one who stood in place of the
And so now

I don't think that's what our case law indicates is

Your Honor, any other questions or facts that need
to be clarified from your perspective?

20

THE COURT:

21

case that was cited?

22

MR. STARR:

23

The Waschesa

Did you want to address the

I do.

Waschesa

Thank you, Your Honor.

case is distinguishable because, in

24 J that case, the court found the mother, in her pleadings, had
l
25 I admitted that she did not need the support, that there had
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been other circumstances where the children were well
provided for.

And the court found that dubious to — to

suggest that on one hand and yet, on the other hand, seek
contempt and seek a judgment.
THE COURT:

And I believe that's —

Hasn't this case been abrogated by

statute anyway that — and by subsequent rulings of the Court
that would state that — that the paying parent still has to
pay — have to pay.

I mean, even if — even if the child has

some type of a million dollar trust from a stepparent, they
have to pay until they get the order modified.
MR. STARR:

Correct.

There is a common law duty

of support which is there, and there's only two ways I'm
aware of that this back due amount goes away, and that is,
one, voluntary written waiver by the obligee — in this case
petitioner — or, two, seek a court order modifying such.
And neither of those happened in this case.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Anything else, then?
MR. TRACY:

Yes, Your Honor.

That is correct, but

there is one — one instance that has been forgotten or
overlooked in this case.
In the case of Hamilton

v.

Hamilton,

the court

still has discretion to make — to make changes to arrears.
And even though the back child support cannot be
retroactively changed, the arrears that have accrued over
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time is in the discretion of the court, and I believe the
child's welfare in that case, the court can use discretion
determining how much arrears are going to be owed.
THE COURT:

Well, I think you're correct, there's

somewhat of an equitable proceeding.

On the other hand, it

is a matter committed to the Court's sound discretion.
let me find the Hamilton
correct?

case here.

And

You cited that,

You've cited that in your pleadings?
MR. TRACY:

It actually came from the petitioner's

side, Your Honor, in the supplemental.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STARR:

Your Honor, we cited that on page 5 in

support of our argument that the Court has discretion for
other matters which we'll address shortly.
THE COURT:
Okay.

Right.

Okay.

Got a 13-year-old case?

All right.
Well, in this case, the Court finds that, at the

time that the child reached the age of majority that
respondent was in arrears on child support; that the Office
of Recovery Services was making some effort to collect those
arrears, and then — and then, that it is undisputed that,
after the child did — was emancipated that respondent gave
her $3,000 for school.
Based on those facts and the application of the
law, the Court determines that that money was paid directly
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to the child, who was then no longer a child; it was paid —
not paid pursuant to the decree as ordered; and that there
was no written waiver; and that — further, that the — that —
further, that respondent should not be given credit for that
because he's coming before the Court with unclean hands,
being in arrears.

The Court is a strong believer that

people who bring children into the world should be
responsible to support them.
And I would also note that, even when the
petitioner allegedly went into hiding, it looks like there
was some arrearage involved at that point.
unclean hands at that point.

So with, also,

Respondent certainly could

have located petitioner with a little bit of effort.

ORS

knew where she was, and while I don't condone hiding
children, still, the right to receive support is the
child's, and the court jealously guards that right on behalf
of our children in the state of Utah.
So the $3,000 would not be allowed to be a credit
against the arrearages, which amount to $11,170 — $11,670,
and petitioner would be entitled to a judgment in that
amount.
Now, the — having an arrearage on child support is
almost, per se, contempt, but I'll allow the parties to
address that issue at this point.

And what sanctions, if

any, should be imposed, if the Court does conclude that
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there is contempt.
MR. STARR:

Thank you, Your Honor.

As stated in our brief, there's a three-prong test
that is required in the state of Utah to find someone in
contempt.

You first have to find that the party knew the

order, knew what was required.

Second, that the party had

the ability to comply and, three, that the party willfully
failed to obey the court orders.
I don't think there's any — any argument on
respondent's side today that he knew of the court order.

He

was served, he accepted service, the judgment was entered in
1995, which was the child support order throughout this
period of time.

He was aware of it; he communicated with

ORS; he made partial payments — three payments of $110
during that time.

So I believe the first prong is

established.
As to the — as to the second prong, whether or not
there's an ability — I think this is where the contention
lies — and our court — our case law is clear that you can
have a defense of inability to comply with the court order;
however, the Kesimakus

case, as we briefed, requires that

that defense is only effective where the person charged
exercises due diligence.

And I think Your Honor has already

noted that that has not happened in this case, that — that
respondent has not made — he did not make a serious effort
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through the years to make payments.

There was a bunch of

zeros showing up through the months and through the years.
And, you know, we — we don't often understand
zeros.

If there had been some attempt, fifty, forty, a

hundred here and there, perhaps this defense of inability
would — would be a bit more pressing on the Court.

But,

given the fact that there's very little support having been
paid through the years, I believe that that defense is
ineffective under the Kesimakus

holding.

Comm. Patton cited the Mansel
Proctor

v.

Smith

and the

cases at the — at the order to show cause hearing

back in January.

Respondent seems to argue that those are

not applicable in a contempt proceeding; rather, those apply
in establishing an amount of child support.

Be that as it

may, it's very clear from those cases, the holdings there,
that one cannot be voluntarily underemployed or unemployed
to avoid a child support payment.

And, certainly, as was

cited in our brief, in the Ozmus case, a party does not have
the right to sacrifice the rights of the parties that he's
obligated to support by engaging in underemployment or
furthering his or her education; providing support for
children is his first duty.

And that's exactly what we have

here.
Respondent, in effect, although he argues he has
been working overseas, working in lower-paying jobs now,
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attending school, he's — he's held the previous child's
right — and now petitioner's right — held them hostage to
receiving that support.
of years.

This has been going on for a number

And this was a voluntary choice of his, to

further his education, to seek a specific type of
employment.

And this intentional deprivation of his court-

ordered obligation should not be taken lightly by this
court.
It's fairly clear as well that there may be
something else going on, which I think Mr. Tracy has alluded
to in his argument today.

We've attached to our

supplemental memorandum a telephone note from ORS that
indicates that he spoke with an agent at ORS and stated,
quote, that: "He doesn't want to pay.

He insists the child

is not living with the custodial parent, he never gets to
see the child."
As Your Honor has noted, the time has passed to
make arguments about custody and visitation rights, but,
clearly, the child support issue itself is still present
before this Court.

I believe his statements there

constitute a willful refusal to obey the child support
obligation that was ordered by this Court.
And so the fact is he did retain the legal
ability.

Whether or not he personally chose to exercise

that ability to its fullest is irrelevant; the child was
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owed a duty to support; petitioner is now owed a duty for
compensation.

And I believe that satisfies the second and

third prong of — of the requirements to find someone in
contempt.
We have — we have requested some specific relief,
Your Honor.

Would you like to reserve that and stay on this

point for now, or should I carry on with those points?
THE COURT:

You may carry on with that.

MR. STARR:

Well, given that a judgment has been

ordered by Your Honor today, we're asking the Court to
exercise its discretion — as the Hamilton
order minimum monthly payments.

case noted — to

Otherwise, petitioner will

walk out of the courtroom today with a judgment but, in
theory, not much ability to collect on that.

And there's no

indication from the previous history that respondent will
pay petitioner that amount.

There's been years and years

and years of opportunity to do so, and it has not happened.
And so we're asking the Court to exercise its
discretion, pursuant to statute and pursuant to case law, to
sentence the respondent to jail and to enter those
sanctions, but to stay the sentence upon his compliance, and
to establish a minimum amount of payment to be paid to
petitioner each month.
We suggest a minimum of $25 0, but even under that
amount, it will take over four years — or close to four
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years to pay petitioner this amount that was just awarded
her.

Doing so will incentivize respondent to make those

payments and to give him a reason to not fail to make them.

It's the practice of this Court, certainly in the
commissioners' courtrooms, often to schedule a review
hearing, say, 90, 120 days out to review the payments that
have or have not been made, and if respondent is not current
in his payments at that time, this Court would have
authority to execute the jail sentence.

And perhaps that is

the approach that we would request this Court take at this
time.

This is granted explicitly in Vonhenk

v.

Thomas,

as

we've cited in our brief, and this type of remedy, I
believe, will — will help petitioner receive the relief that
she's actually seeking, which is not just a judgment, but to
be compensated.
We've also requested attorney fees.

Petitioner

did acquire the assistance of counsel for purposes of the
hearing in January, and she was awarded an amount, $750, by
Comm. Patton at that time.
that amount.

She's seeking reimbursement of

She's also seeking reimbursement of my fees

and costs incurred to represent her at this objection and
de novo hearing.
I have not submitted an affidavit of fees because
I was unclear how long today's hearing would take or whether
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Your Honor would ask me to prepare an order on the hearing,
but I certainly can submit that after.

And we would ask

that that — that those amounts of attorneys' fees would be
added on top of the judgment previously awarded.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Tracy?
MR. TRACY:

Your Honor, since my daughter came

into the world, I have used every means available to me.

At

16 years old, I was working midnight shifts at a supermarket
in order to comply with the court's judgment at that time.
Also, reimburse for the birth of my daughter in the amount
of $1,000.
I entered into military service for five years,
completed a bachelor's and master's degree while working —
while working full time to supply — to — to comply with that
judgment.

Throughout the years, up to 2003, completing a

master's degree, also working full time.
In the amount of time that I was in Germany from
2000, for the length of my legal studies in Germany, I
worked as an arms control specialist for the U.S. Army in
Europe, liaison officer with the U.S. Army, and also the —
THE COURT:

What years was that?

MR. TRACY:

That was 2 0 02, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

So you finished in 2002?

When were

you discharged?

34

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MR. TRACY:

I was discharged from the Army in

1996, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. TRACY:

So from 1990 - from 1990, when my

daughter was born, till she was emancipated in 2002, any
time that I have been employed I have made child support
payments to my daughter.
THE COURT:

Again, as I stated —

So you've not been employed, really,

since 2003, then?
MR. TRACY:

2 0 03.

I - when I was - 2003, from

2003 to 2005 - excuse me, Your Honor.

From 2005 to 2007, I

worked as a clerk with the district court in Heidelberg,
Germany, with a compensation of one thousand — approximately
$1,000 per month from the court.

That was required to

complete the legal education in Germany.
After the completion of the first bar exam, they
require a second bar exam, two years working for the courts.
That's what I was remunerated.

It was barely enough to

cover my own expenses.
Since my daughter's been emancipated in 2008 and
before, actually, this petition was filed with this court, I
enrolled in the School of Law at the University of San
Diego.

Again, that was after the time — this was actually

before the time of the petition in front of this court.
Substantial student loans have been taken.
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They've been listed in the — in the petition before this
Court, of $20,000.

Should I actually stop legal education

at this time — and, again, $20,000 has just been paid in
tuition costs for next semester.

I am limited in my living

expenses to what the University of San Diego certifies and
also what the U.S. Department of education allows for living
expenses, which barely covers the living expenses at this
particular point in time.
If I were to discontinue my legal education at the
University of San Diego, Your Honor, I would be — I would
have to begin paying back those immediately.

And without

actually completing the legal education would be a huge
disadvantage of about $30,000.
I, again, offered during the last hearing with
Mr. — with Counsel — the petitioner to make minimum payments
until law school was completed, and then expedite — balloon
payment at the completion of the education.

This would

enable me to be in a position to — to not — as the
petitioner cites to some nebulous "I'll make a lot of money
in the future," I am a trained attorney, I'm unable to
practice my profession in the United States, my place of
residency currently, and for that reason, the Court should
allow me to continue that legal education.
THE COURT:

But you could - you could do that in

Germany, though, I presume.
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MR. TRACY:

Practice my —

THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. TRACY:

As the Court well knows, at the end of

my legal education, I clerked for a law firm in Germany in
the banking and finance sector.

This sector completely

dried up and there was no employment, not for new clerks;
they weren't hiring any — any associates, and that situation
has not changed currently, Your Honor.
My wife is a resident here in Utah.

I decided to

return to the United States, and that's why I am in the
United States, to be with my wife.

We were separated for

two years during my clerkship in Germany.
So for that, we ask that the — the Court should
impose a burden, a monthly burden, that it would be low
enough that I could continue my legal education.
As far as the issue of contempt goes, as mentioned
by the Court during the last hearing, the petitioner's
already secured the — receiving that amount of the judgment
in that I am unable to practice my profession until that
judgment would be — would be tilled.

So she's already

secured that — she's already secured payment at the end of
the legal education.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Any response?
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MR. STARR:

Yeah.

I think what I heard from - or

from respondent's argument is that he's had the ability.
May not have been the ability, the income that he would have
liked, but he retained the ability to work, to be employed;
he did not seek to change the court order and the court
order is what it is, and we're now seeking to compensate
petitioner.

And that's really the heart of the matter, why

we're here today, Your Honor.
I think I heard respondent admit that he would
agree to make some minimum payments.
is how much.

I guess the question

We don't have any financial declaration or

statements or anything that would indicate what his budget
might be.

He indicated that he received a disbursement from

the student loan.
You know, Your Honor, I worked two years during my
law school experience, as well as went to school full time,
and I don't think they would have appreciated that had they
known, but I did because I had to.
family.

I had to support my

And I'm not sure what respondent's opportunities

are, but he's — he's certainly capable of doing something
and making some minimum payments.
And I think we ought to separate these parties.
They're connected by one last issue, and I think they'd,
otherwise, rather be alone and move on with their separate
lives and to — to have minimum payments coming in will
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extend their relationship far beyond what either of them
desire at this point in time, and may just extend the
litigation, should other circumstances arise that require us
to visit the Court again and incur more legal fees and costs
and problems.
So, again, we would recommend a minimum of $250 a
month payment.

If respondent is willing to agree to a

balloon payment at the end, commencement of his law school
experience, that may expedite it shortly, as I believe he
has two years remaining to complete that.
more like 18 months or so.

Maybe actually

That might shorten it as well.

Our requests remain the same.
argument with regard to attorney fees.

I didn't hear any
I would just like to

add to that argument statute Code 3 0-3-3 separates an award
of attorney fees at the outset of a case versus in an
enforcement proceeding.

And the statute is clear and

directs the Court that, when there is a party who has
substantially prevailed on the issues, they bring an
enforcement proceeding, that the court is fully authorized
to award their fees.

And I believe that petitioner has

substantially prevailed on her claims in this matter and,
therefore, the Court should enter attorney fees on that
basis.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

All right.
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The Court finds in this case that the respondent
was aware of his child support obligation, as stated in the
decree of divorce.
dispute there.

There's no — doesn't seem to be any

The fact is that he did make three sporadic

payments since 2003 of $110.
The Court would also note that — find that
respondent has not paid child support, and, further, with
regard to his argument that he had not the ability to pay
it, the Court would note that, at least from 2003 to 2007,
the Court takes judicial notice that the unemployment rate
in this country was around 5 percent, which economists
indicate is zero unemployment.

Now, I realize that that's

a — that's an average and that's — you know, that doesn't
mean that everybody's employed that wants to be employed,
but, nonetheless, there were plenty of opportunities for
employment, at least up to the point where the economy went
south on us after the collapse of the housing market.
The Court would note that, looking at the records
of — of ORS which have been supplied, although those aren't
entirely clear in every — what each column is, they are
clear that the — the payments — the payment column shows
zero, with the exception of three dates, 2-5-2007, 3-8-2007,
and 4-9-2007.

And as judges, at least in this court, are

fond of saying, we don't understand zeroes.

I could

understand if there were some $40, $50, $100 payments for a
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substantial portion of this time; we don't understand
zeroes.
And so there was no — there was no modification of
the child support order in the decree and so the Court would
find that respondent is not excused from having paid child
support for the substantial period of time.

He's not — h e ' s

not only excused for not paying it, he's not excused for, in
any way, of having the ability to pay something.

He should

have paid something during this time and should have
obtained a modification of the order.
The Court is influenced by the fact that he's
evidently law-trained in Germany and should have been able
to handle this — would have been a fairly simple matter to
find the resources to file a petition to modify the order.
So based on those findings, the Court would find
the respondent in contempt of court for disobeying the — the
requirement to pay child support.

And as a sanction in this

case, the Court would order that the respondent pay minimum
payments of $250 per month, first payment due in 30 days, to
petitioner on this judgment.
review hearing.

That — the Court will set a

Respondent can purge his contempt by paying

off this child support debt.
The Court would also order that he pay attorneys'
fees, reasonable attorneys' fees, to — to petitioner.

The

Court would expect an affidavit in compliance with the Rules
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of Civil Procedure, Rule 73, stating what - what fees are
claimed.

And we'll set a - we'll set a review hearing in

about 120 days.

The issue of that hearing would be whether

the payments are being made and, if not, whether respondent
should go to jail as a result.

I don't want to — I want to

give him a chance to voluntarily comply at this point and
show good faith without sending him to — without imposing a
jail sentence.

But have no doubt that the Court would

certainly — if payments are not being made, the Court
would — that would be an issue, whether he should go spend
time at the Utah County jail.
So that would be the order of the Court.
Would you prepare an order to that effect,
Mr. Starr, and serve that on the respondent?
MR. STARR:

I will.

THE COURT:

And then we'll take it from there.

And then if you'll — do you have an amount of time — we'll
set a hearing date here in a moment, but do you have an
amount of time that you think you can get your affidavit in?
MR. STARR:
week.

Your Honor, I can submit that within a

But also ask that, if we're going to schedule an

actual hearing date, I'm not sure; I haven't spoken with my
client, but given her limited resources, she may wish to
approach that review hearing on her own, and I would ask
that I be able to withdraw as her counsel prior to that
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time, if she —
THE COURT:

Well, you - you can —

MR. STARR:

— if she instructs me.

THE COURT:

— you can file a motion to withdraw,

as appropriate, and then we'll — we'll look at it, okay?
MR. STARR:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

All right.

Let's go out, maybe,

something like 12 0 days and - what, November something?
THE CLERK:

November 2 9th, at 8:30.

THE COURT:

How about November 2 9th at 8:30?

MR. TRACY:

If I could just power up my calendar,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

That's fine.

MR. TRACY:

If I could request a Monday, if Your

Honor has hearings scheduled for Mondays.
THE COURT:

We would do that on a Monday morning.

We can do it any time after 8:00 on a Monday.
THE CLERK:

November 2 9th's a Monday.

THE COURT:

2 9th would be a Monday.

MR. STARR:

That'll work for us, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Do you want to do it at 8:30, early,

or would you rather go later in the morning?
MR. TRACY:

The latest in the afternoon would be

preferable, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, we quit hearing civil
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cases at about 11:30.
court.

That's when we start mental health

So it'd have to be somewhere between 8:0.0 and 11:30,

typically.

We could do it at 11:00 or 11:15, if you want.
MR. TRACY:

Are hearings scheduled for Fridays,

Your Honor?
THE COURT:

We can do a hearing on a Friday.

MR. TRACY:

That would be - if it was scheduled

for a Friday, the time would not matter, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Right.

We can set it on a Friday and

then, if we have a jury trial, we'll just interrupt the jury
trial to have the hearing.
THE CLERK:

December 3rd.

THE COURT:

So December 3rd?

THE CLERK:

2:00?

THE COURT:

Well, why don't we - since it's - why

Okay.

don't we say — why don't we say 9:00 and then, if we have a
jury trial, we can just handle it before we actually seat a
jury, conduct voir dire.
THE CLERK:

So 9:00?

THE COURT:

9:00?

All right.

Thank you very much then.

MR. STARR:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Okay.

Very good.
Court's in

recess.

(Whereupon, the hearing was
concluded at 11:03 a.m.)
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